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4 The Boldt Decision in Canada
aboriginal treaty rights to fish on the pacific

Douglas C. Harris

T

he Oregon Treaty of 1846 established the forty-ninth parallel as
the boundary between British and American interests in western
North America. Described in treaty text and drawn on a map in
a distant capital, this international border severed Aboriginal worlds that
at the time were largely oblivious to the remote geopolitical maneuverings of two imperial powers. Eventually the border would constrain the
movement of people whose lives spanned it, in some cases restricting or
eliminating access to important resource procurement and village sites,
and also to markets on its other side.1 More immediately, after 1846
those to the north of the border negotiated with the British Crown the
terms of their coexistence with incoming settlers, those to its south with
the United States. As a result, while some of the Coast Salish and
Kwak⬘waka⬘wakw peoples in what would become British Columbia concluded treaties between 1850 and 1854 with the Crown’s representative,
James Douglas, the tribes in the United States settled with the governor
of the Washington territory, Isaac I. Stevens, in 1854 and 1855.
In the Douglas and the Stevens treaties, as the agreements came to be
known, Britain and the United States sought to extinguish Aboriginal
rights and title and to replace them with a deﬁned set of treaty rights.
These treaty rights included monetary payment and guarantees of
reserved land, hunting rights, and ﬁshing rights.2 The ﬁsheries provi-
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sions in the written text of the treaties were short. The Douglas treaties
reserved to Aboriginal peoples the right to “their ﬁsheries as formerly”;3
the Stevens treaties provided that “the right of taking ﬁsh at usual and
accustomed grounds and stations is further secured to said Indians in
common with all citizens of the Territory.”4
This essay focuses on the relationship between U.S. and Canadian
judicial interpretations of these treaty rights to ﬁsh. In the ﬁrst two sections the essay describes the rulings in United States v. Washington
(known as “the Boldt decision”)5 and Washington v. Washington State
Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel Association (Passenger Fishing
Vessel).6 It then explores the impact of these two cases from the United
States on the general development of Aboriginal and treaty rights in
Canada. Although not widely cited in Canadian courts, the U.S. decisions have had a profound inﬂuence on Canadian Aboriginal law.7 In
particular, the priority that Canadian courts accord to conservation and
then to the Aboriginal food ﬁsheries, before commercial and sport ﬁsheries, is closely correlated with the ﬁshing rights framework established
in the Boldt decision. In addition, the idea that treaty rights to ﬁsh entail
a right to a moderate livelihood, now well established in Canada, comes
directly from the U.S. Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Stevens
treaties in Passenger Fishing Vessel.
The third part of the essay considers the historical evidence pertaining to ﬁshing rights in the Douglas treaties and suggests various interpretations. Finally, it turns to the Boldt decision and away from
Passenger Fishing Vessel to offer the outlines of a reasonable judicial
determination of treaty rights to ﬁsh in British Columbia. The question
remains whether these U.S. decisions provide useful guidance for the
interpretation of the ﬁshing rights provision in the Douglas treaties. The
difference in legal jurisdictions certainly limits their applicability, but
Canadian courts are more inclined to consider decisions from other jurisdictions than are their U.S. counterparts. In the area of Aboriginal law
Canadian courts frequently refer to U.S. Supreme Court Chief Justice
John Marshall’s nineteenth-century trilogy and many later Indian and
treaty rights cases as well.8
Beyond case law, the fact that many ﬁsh — including salmon, halibut,
and herring — traverse the international boundary suggests that courts
should pay some attention to judicial pronouncements from its other
side. Moreover, except for the two treaties with the Kwak⬘waka⬘wakw
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at the north end of Vancouver Island, the ﬁsheries covered by the Douglas treaties are in Coast Salish territory, as are the Stevens treaties
around Puget Sound. Douglas and Stevens negotiated with peoples who
shared a cultural heritage and an economic base in the ﬁsheries that
long preceded the Canada-U.S. border in western North America.9 They
also share a broadly similar history of lost access to their ﬁsheries, at
least until the Boldt decision.10 For these reasons, and for the simple
fact that the ﬁshing rights under the Stevens treaties have received more
legal and scholarly attention than the ﬁshing rights under the Douglas
treaties, the U.S. decisions are a relevant and important resource in
determining the division and management of the ﬁsheries in British
Columbia.
UNITED STATES V. WASHINGTON

(the boldt decision)

In 1970 the U.S. government and several tribal governments sued the
State of Washington for its repeated harassment of Indian ﬁshers and its
disregard for the ﬁshing rights in the Stevens treaties. The treaties provided that “the right of taking ﬁsh at usual and accustomed grounds and
stations is further secured to said Indians in common with all citizens of
the Territory.”11 From the advent of an industrial commercial ﬁshery
on the Paciﬁc Coast in the last quarter of the nineteenth century, the
state, which has jurisdiction over ﬁsheries in state waters, maintained
that the treaties did little more than permit tribe members to participate
individually in the ﬁsheries on the same terms as the rest of the public.
The federal government disagreed. It presented extensive historical and
anthropological evidence to the court to establish that although the tribes
had ceded land under the treaties, they had reserved to themselves extensive off-reservation ﬁshing rights, including the right to a substantial
share of the ﬁsh that returned to the tribes’ “usual and accustomed” ﬁshing places.12 Given this divergence of opinion, all the parties understood
U.S. v. Washington to be an important test case, meant to settle issues
unresolved after several earlier judicial interpretations of treaty ﬁshing
rights.13
The principal rulings in the ensuing decision, released on February 12,
1974, involved the allocation and management of the ﬁsheries. First, Judge
George Boldt held that the treaty right to ﬁsh “in common” amounted to
a right to catch up to 50 percent of the harvestable anadromous ﬁsh
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(salmon and steelhead) at “usual and accustomed” tribal ﬁsheries: “‘In
common with’ means sharing equally the opportunity to take ﬁsh at
‘usual and accustomed grounds and stations’; therefore, non-treaty ﬁshermen shall have the opportunity to take up to 50% of the harvestable
number of ﬁsh that may be taken by all ﬁshermen at usual and accustomed grounds and stations and treaty right ﬁshermen shall have the
opportunity to take up to the same percentage of harvestable ﬁsh.”14
By “harvestable” Judge Boldt meant commercially harvestable; the ﬁsheries were to be divided equally after accounting for conservation
requirements and the needs of the Indian ceremonial and subsistence
ﬁshery. Ceremonial and subsistence ﬁshing, he wrote, had “a special
treaty signiﬁcance distinct from and superior to the taking of ﬁsh for
commercial purposes.”15
Judge Boldt also held that the tribes had the right to manage their offreservation ﬁsheries, and he set out the terms under which that responsibility might be assumed. Two tribes — the Quinault and the Yakima —
could assume jurisdiction immediately because of their existing ﬁsheries
management experience, the others when they had established the capacity to do so. The state had the right to regulate the off-reservation treaty
right to ﬁsh but only to the extent necessary to ensure the preservation
of the species: “The ﬁshing right was reserved by the Indians and cannot
be qualiﬁed by the state. The state has police power to regulate off reservation ﬁshing only to the extent reasonable and necessary for conservation of the resource. For this purpose, conservation is deﬁned to mean
perpetuation of the ﬁsheries species. Additionally the state must not discriminate against the Indians, and must meet appropriate due process
standards.”16 In other words the treaty right to ﬁsh had priority over the
state’s right to manage the ﬁshery, with the one exception that the state
might limit the treaty right in order to preserve and sustain the ﬁsheries.
However, the state had to achieve its conservation objectives legitimately
and fairly; it could not discriminate against the Indians by imposing conservation burdens so that others might ﬁsh.
The Boldt decision outraged many non-Aboriginal ﬁshers, who turned
to protest and civil disobedience but also to the state courts.17 In 1977
the Washington Supreme Court held that Judge Boldt’s interpretation
of the treaties, by allocating the right to catch up to half of the commercial ﬁsheries to a small proportion of the population (treaty Indians),
violated the equal rights protection in the U.S. Constitution.18 In this
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context of legal and political turmoil, Judge Boldt assumed continuing
oversight of the implementation of his ruling.
Then in 1979, on appeal from the cases in the state courts, the U.S.
Supreme Court largely conﬁrmed the Boldt decision. However, in Passenger Fishing Vessel the Supreme Court altered the original decision in
two ways: it held that the 50 percent allocation was to include the tribal
ceremonial and subsistence ﬁshery (rather than calculated after accounting for that ﬁshery) and 50 percent was the maximum allocation (not
the minimum). If the ability of tribal members to secure a “moderate living” from the ﬁshery required fewer ﬁsh, then the treaty right could be
honored with an allocation of less than 50 percent. The Supreme Court
offered no legal or historical basis for limiting the right to a level that
supported a “moderate livelihood” — a ruling that has not been widely
adopted in U.S. Indian treaty interpretation19 but, according to the
Court, was central to the decision:
The central principle here must be that Indian treaty rights to a natural
resource that once was thoroughly and exclusively exploited by the Indians
secures so much as, but no more than, is necessary to provide the Indians
with a livelihood — that is to say, a moderate living. Accordingly, while the
maximum possible allocation to the Indians is ﬁxed at 50%, the minimum is
not; the latter will . . . be modiﬁed in response to changing circumstances. If,
for example, a tribe should dwindle to just a few members, or if it should ﬁnd
other sources of support that lead it to abandon its ﬁsheries, a 45% or 50%
allocation of an entire run that passes through its customary ﬁshing grounds
would be manifestly inappropriate because the livelihood of the tribe under
these circumstances could not reasonably require an allotment of a large number of ﬁsh.20

Although measures to implement the treaty rights were contested after
the Supreme Court decision, the basic parameters had been established.
Under the Stevens treaties Indian tribes had a right to catch up to 50 percent of the harvestable ﬁsh at usual and accustomed places in order to
secure for their members a “moderate living”; if that could be achieved
with fewer ﬁsh, then the entitlement would be reduced. Once they had
demonstrated the capacity to manage the ﬁsheries, Indian tribes were to
assume jurisdiction over their ﬁsheries. The Washington Fisheries and
Game departments had the capacity to limit the treaty right, but only
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for the purpose of ensuring the continuing viability of the resource. Conservation measures could not discriminate against Indians.

from the boldt decision to
G L A D S T O N E , and M A R S H A L L

JACK, SPARROW,

Within three weeks after the U.S. Supreme Court’s 1979 decision in Passenger Fishing Vessel, the Supreme Court of Canada released its decision in Regina v. Jack.21 It was the ﬁrst foray of that Court into
Aboriginal ﬁshing rights in British Columbia, although the members of
the Cowichan Tribes who were charged with Fisheries Act offenses did
not raise an Aboriginal or treaty rights defense. The Cowichan, a Coast
Salish community on eastern Vancouver Island, were not party to the
Douglas treaties, and the entrenchment of Aboriginal and treaty rights
in the Canadian constitution was still three years away.22 The Cowichan
therefore relied on the colonial policy not to interfere with Aboriginal
ﬁsheries and on the federal government’s commitment in the terms of
union with British Columbia, when it assumed responsibility for Indians
and ﬁsheries in British Columbia in 1871, that it would continue “a policy as liberal as that hitherto pursued by the British Columbia government” in its management of Indian affairs.23
The Jack decision turned on the details of Canadian federalism,
whereas the Boldt decision involved an interpretation of treaty rights in
Washington State. It is hardly surprising therefore that the Supreme
Court of Canada did not refer to the U.S. case. However, two basic principles outlined in the Boldt decision — that the government with jurisdiction over the ﬁsheries might limit the exercise of the treaty right to ﬁsh
only for conservation purposes, and that the Indian food and ceremonial
ﬁshery had priority over other ﬁsheries — reappeared in the Canadian
decision. The majority dismissed the Cowichan defense, rejecting the
argument that the terms of union inhibited or limited Canada’s jurisdiction over Aboriginal ﬁsheries. Justice Brian Dickson concurred in the
result, although for very different reasons.
Justice Dickson found that “the colony [of British Columbia] gave
priority to the Indian ﬁshery as an appropriate pursuit for the coastal
Indians, primarily for food purposes and, to a lesser extent, for barter
purposes with white residents.”24 Therefore, because the federal government assumed responsibility for Indians and ﬁsheries in British
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Columbia and undertook to treat the former as liberally as the colonial
government had done, it had to recognize the priority of the Indian ﬁsheries. However, this priority was subject to the overriding goal of conservation, and Justice Dickson adopted the following priority scheme:
“(i) conservation; (ii) Indian ﬁshing; (iii) non-Indian commercial ﬁshing,
or (iv) non-Indian sports ﬁshing.” The priority of the Indian ﬁshery, he
continued, “is at its strongest when we speak of Indian ﬁshing for food
purposes, but somewhat weaker when we come to local commercial purposes. If there are to be limitations upon the taking of salmon here, then
those limitations must not bear more heavily upon the Indian ﬁshery
than the other forms of the ﬁshery.”25 The proposition that an Indian
food ﬁshery had priority and that the federal Department of Fisheries
might have to justify its regulation of the Indian ﬁsheries on the basis of
conservation were important developments — ones that bore a distinct
resemblance to the ruling in the Boldt decision.
Eleven years later the Supreme Court of Canada, then led by Chief
Justice Dickson, would develop this priority scheme in Regina v. Sparrow, the case that would become the cornerstone in the interpretation of
Aboriginal rights in Canada.26 In Sparrow the Court held that the
Musqueam, a Coast Salish community at the mouth of the Fraser River
and not party to the Douglas treaties, had an “aboriginal right to ﬁsh for
food and social and ceremonial purposes.”27 Chief Justice Dickson and
Justice Gérard La Forest then applied the priority scheme ﬁrst outlined
in Jack to infuse the right with content. In practice, the right provided
that “if, in a given year, conservation needs required a reduction in the
number of ﬁsh to be caught such that the number equalled the number
required for food by the Indians, then all the ﬁsh available after conservation would go to the Indians according to the constitutional nature of
their ﬁshing right. If, more realistically, there were still ﬁsh after the
Indian food requirements were met, then the brunt of conservation measures would be borne by the practices of sport and commercial ﬁshing.”28
Thus, after conservation the Indian food ﬁshery had priority. But conservation was, in the Court’s words, a “compelling and substantial”
objective that would justify the federal government’s infringement of an
Aboriginal right to ﬁsh.29 To this extent, the judgment mirrored the
Boldt decision without citing it.
However, Canada’s Supreme Court went further, suggesting that the
federal government might have other objectives, such as the prevention
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of harm, that might justify infringing an Aboriginal right. The standard
was high; the “public interest,” for example, was too vague and uncertain an objective to justify limiting a constitutional right.30 This constraint on the Crown’s capacity to infringe Aboriginal and treaty rights
marks an important difference between Canadian and U.S. law. While
federal power to abrogate Indian treaty rights in the United States is
nearly unconstrained,31 if seldom exercised, in Canada the federal government’s capacity to limit Aboriginal and treaty rights has been reduced
since those rights were entrenched in the constitution in 1982. As a
result, in Sparrow the Supreme Court held that the federal government
must justify its infringement of an Aboriginal right by establishing a compelling and substantial objective (such as conservation), and that its
actions in pursuing that objective reﬂect the honor of the Crown in its
relationship with Aboriginal peoples.32
In Sparrow the Supreme Court did not address the priority of an Aboriginal right to a commercial ﬁshery. Justice Dickson had hinted in Jack
that it would be less secure, and the Court conﬁrmed this approach six
years later in the case of Regina v. Gladstone.33 In that case Chief Justice
Antonio Lamer, writing for the majority, concluded that the Heiltsuk
had an Aboriginal right to a commercial herring-spawn-on-kelp ﬁshery.
This right, he continued, conferred priority but not exclusivity.34 As
a result, the federal government might justiﬁably infringe the right to
a commercial ﬁshery not only for conservation purposes, but also to
pursue policies of “economic and regional fairness” or to recognize
“the historical reliance upon, and participation in, the ﬁshery by nonaboriginal groups.”35
These objectives were too broad for some members of the Court. Justice Beverley McLachlin replied in Regina v. Vander Peet, a decision the
Supreme Court released with Gladstone, that Chief Justice Lamer’s test,
which required a balancing of social policy objectives against constitutional rights, was “indeterminate and ultimately more political than
legal.”36 In rejecting Chief Justice Lamer’s approach, Justice McLachlin
deﬁned the right to a commercial ﬁshery much less expansively, suggesting that “the Aboriginal right to trade in herring spawn on kelp from
the Bella Bella region is limited to such trade as secures the modern
equivalent of sustenance: the basics of food, clothing and housing, supplemented by a few amenities.”37 Similarly, in her dissenting opinion in
Vander Peet, Justice Claire L’Heureux-Dubé constructed the commercial
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ﬁshing right as “an Aboriginal right to sell, trade and barter ﬁsh for livelihood, support and sustenance purposes.”38 These dissenting opinions
deﬁned the right more narrowly and thus avoided Chief Justice Lamer’s
expansive understanding of what might justify infringing an Aboriginal
right. However, the basis for this narrower interpretation is unclear.
Chief Justice Lamer responded that “the evidence in this case [Gladstone]
does not justify limiting the right to harvest herring spawn on kelp on a
commercial basis to, for example, the sale of herring spawn on kelp for
the purposes of obtaining a ‘moderate livelihood.’”39
The deﬁnitions in the dissenting opinions of Justices McLachlin and
L’Heureux-Dubé of Aboriginal rights to commercial ﬁsheries as securing
the “modern equivalent of sustenance” or “livelihood, support and sustenance” were new developments in the Supreme Court of Canada. They
derive from the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Passenger Fishing Vessel, although through reference to the dissenting opinion of Justice Douglas Lambert in the British Columbia Court of Appeal rather than to the
U.S. cases themselves. In Vander Peet Justice Lambert described the Aboriginal right to the salmon ﬁshery ﬁsh as securing the right to “a moderate livelihood” from that ﬁshery, and he acknowledged Passenger
Fishing Vessel as his source.40
In the context of Aboriginal rights, therefore, the right to ﬁsh for food
is broadly established following Sparrow. However, each First Nation
must establish the right to a commercial ﬁshery independently. Where
established (and to this point only the Heiltsuk in Gladstone have successfully established such a right, and only for their herring spawn-onkelp ﬁshery), the commercial right is expansive, although subject to
broad federal powers to infringe that right. The dissenting approach —
to deﬁne the rights in terms of a moderate livelihood — has not been
adopted.
In the context of treaty rights (as distinct from Aboriginal rights) to
ﬁsh, however, the moderate livelihood standard is well established in
Canada. Again, although the Canadian rulings have not included direct
citations, it is plain that this understanding originates in the U.S.
Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Stevens treaties in Passenger Fishing Vessel. In Regina v. Marshall, for example, the Mi⬘kmaq of Nova
Scotia contested a prosecution on the grounds that they had a treaty
right to ﬁsh derived from an eighteenth-century agreement with the
British. The Supreme Court of Canada agreed in 1999 but limited the
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commercial right to ﬁsh to that which secured the “equivalent to a moderate livelihood”; the right did “not extend to the open-ended accumulation of wealth.”41 Justice Ian Binnie, who wrote for the majority,
tracked the lineage of the “moderate livelihood” deﬁnition of the right
from Justice Lambert in the B.C. Court of Appeal to Justices McLachlin
and L’Heureux Dubé in Gladstone and Vander Peet.42 He did not cite
the American antecedents, but their incorporation through Justice Lambert, who dealt with them at length, seems clear.43
In sum, the principles articulated in the interpretation of the Stevens
treaties are a signiﬁcant presence in the interpretation of Aboriginal and
treaty rights to ﬁsh in Canada, even if the U.S. decisions are seldom cited.
Given the importance of ﬁshing rights to the articulation of Aboriginal
and treaty rights in general, the impact of these principles has been pervasive. With this legal framework established, the question remains how
the courts will interpret the ﬁsheries clause in the Douglas treaties. That
will turn, at least in part, on the historical evidence.

“fisheries as formerly”
The agreements known as the Douglas treaties are the fourteen land purchases from Aboriginal peoples on Vancouver Island made between
1850 and 1854 by James Douglas, the Hudson’s Bay Company’s (HBC)
chief trader and eventual governor of the colonies of Vancouver Island
and mainland British Columbia. They followed the British grant in 1849
of Vancouver Island to the HBC as a proprietary colony for the purposes of settlement. The purchases were limited to the land around the
fort at Victoria, the Saanich Peninsula, the future townsite of Nanaimo
midway up the island, and land around Fort Rupert near the island’s
north eastern end. (See map 4.1.) With the exception in 1899 of Treaty
8 covering the northeast corner of British Columbia, the Douglas treaties
marked the beginning and the end of a treaty process and of the formal
recognition of Aboriginal title in the province until the 1990s.
Much has been written about why Douglas undertook these purchases on Vancouver Island and why he did not continue them. It seems
that recognition of a legal requirement to extinguish Aboriginal title
was an important part of his motivation for beginning the process, but
ebbing enthusiasm for treaties in the Colonial Ofﬁce in London reduced
the incentive to continue the process when other interests intervened.
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map 4.1 Boundaries of the Douglas Treaties, 1850– 54. The treaty process did
not continue beyond 1854, leaving the issue of Native title unresolved on the
rest of Vancouver Island and throughout most of the mainland colony of British
Columbia. source: The treaty boundaries were adapted from information
available in the Government of Canada’s Directory of Federal Real Property
(http://www.tbs-sct.gc.ca/dfrp-rbif/treaty-traite.asp?Language=EN).
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Historical geographer Cole Harris has emphasized Douglas’s pragmatism, born of a lifetime in the fur trade, suggesting that he was less concerned about theories of Indian land policy and even of the law of
Aboriginal title than about ﬁnding workable solutions for Native and
European coexistence.44 Legal historians Hamar Foster and Alan Grove
speculate that the decision of an Oregon court to deny the existence of
Aboriginal title, discredited in Oregon and Washington but picked up
later in Alaska, may also have inﬂuenced Douglas and his successor in
the formation of colonial land policy, Commissioner of Lands Joseph
Trutch, who was openly hostile to the idea of Aboriginal title.45
The legal standing of Aboriginal title may have been fragile enough
in the mid-nineteenth century that colonial authorities were prepared
to ignore it, but there was less doubt about the existence of speciﬁc
Aboriginal rights, particularly rights to hunt and ﬁsh. Moreover, protecting these rights, on which Aboriginal economies depended, ﬁt
Douglas’s pragmatism. Aboriginal peoples’ hunting could coexist with
non-Aboriginal ownership, if not use and occupation, of the land, and
the ﬁshery could be secured without much impact on the land available
for incoming settlers. In anticipation of the treaties, Douglas wrote to
the HBC that he “would strongly recommend, equally as a matter of
justice, and from regard to the future peace of the colony, that the Indians Fishere’s [sic], Village Sitis [sic] and Fields, should be reserved for
their beniﬁt [sic] and fully secured to them by law.”46 HBC secretary
Archibald Barclay, in setting out the company’s obligations and policy
toward Aboriginal peoples on Vancouver Island, instructed Douglas that
the “right of ﬁshing and hunting will be continued to them.”47
On the basis of these instructions, Douglas entered negotiations with
the tribes on southern Vancouver Island. After minimal discussions (of
which no minutes were kept), Douglas asked the chiefs to place X’s on
blank sheets of paper. Following the conclusion of the ﬁrst nine agreements at Fort Victoria between April 29 and May 1, 1850, Douglas
wrote to the HBC to explain his understanding of what had transpired:
“I informed the natives that they would not be disturbed in the possession of their Village sites and enclosed ﬁelds, which are of small extent,
and that they were at liberty to hunt over unoccupied lands, and to carry
on their ﬁsheries with the same freedom as when they were the sole occupants of the country.”48 He forwarded the “signatures” of the chiefs
and asked that the HBC supply the proper conveyancing instrument to
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which the signatures could be attached. Several months later Barclay
replied, approving the agreements and sending a template, based on
New Zealand precedents, that would become the text of the Douglas
treaties.49 The ﬁrst paragraph would provide a description of the lands
that were covered by the treaty; the second described the terms as follows:
The condition of or understanding of this sale is this, that our [Indian] village
sites and enclosed ﬁelds are to be kept for our own use, for the use of our
children, and for those who may follow after us; and the land shall be properly surveyed, hereafter. It is understood, however, that the land itself
becomes the entire property of the white people for ever; it is also understood
that we are at liberty to hunt over the unoccupied lands, and to carry on our
ﬁsheries as formerly.50

Although the structure and content of Barclay’s template emulated
the New Zealand deeds, the ﬁnal clause setting out the hunting and ﬁshing rights was new. The guarantee that the tribes were “at liberty . . . to
carry on our ﬁsheries as formerly” appears to be an abbreviated version
of the agreement Douglas described several months earlier when he
wrote that the Native peoples “were at liberty . . . to carry on their ﬁsheries with the same freedom as when they were the sole occupants of the
country.”
Given this sequence of events, the treaties are best understood as oral
agreements between Douglas and the chiefs. The written texts, based on
imperial precedent, drafted by someone not present at the negotiations
and supplied months afterwards, should be considered as evidence of
the terms of those agreements, not as the agreements themselves.51 As
evidence, the written texts probably provide reasonable indication of
what the HBC thought it needed to do and of how Douglas understood
the treaties. The anthropologist Wilson Duff considered the texts to be
“the white man’s conception (or at least his rationalization) of the situation as it was and of the transaction that took place.”52 They provide
little or highly qualiﬁed evidence at best of how the Aboriginal participants understood the agreements and should not be considered the full
texts of what were oral agreements. However, given the thin documentary and oral history record surrounding the treaties, the written texts
assume particular importance.
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Even the terms of the written texts are not self-evident.53 It is clear,
however, that “ﬁsheries” were important parts of the agreements. A
“ﬁshery” (or its plural, “ﬁsheries”) refers not only to the act of ﬁshing
but also to the places where it occurs. In reserving “ﬁsheries,” therefore,
the Douglas treaties reserved the right to ﬁsh in the places where Aboriginal people ﬁshed. It was the same approach that Governor Stevens
and the tribes in the Washington Territory would adopt in reserving the
“right of taking ﬁsh at usual and accustomed grounds and stations.”54
In neither case, however, were the boundaries of the right carefully
drawn. An abundance of ﬁsh was assumed in the 1850s, and there was
little non-Aboriginal interest in the ﬁsheries. Even so, the ﬁsheries were
not an afterthought. The HBC had deployed some of its workers to the
ﬁsheries of the Fraser River in the 1840s but had realized that it was
more efﬁcient and effective to purchase ﬁsh from Aboriginal ﬁshers.
Those ﬁsh, which the HBC had been barrelling and salting on the Fraser
since the late 1820s, had become one of its principal exports from the
Paciﬁc Coast of North America.55 Thus the treaties were concluded in
a context of well-established and ongoing commercial ﬁshing involving
the HBC and Aboriginal peoples. Douglas believed that this would continue and hoped it would grow.
There is no evidence that either Douglas or the Aboriginal parties
understood their agreements as limited to food ﬁshing. Several years after
concluding the last of the treaties, Douglas informed the Vancouver
Island House of Assembly that Aboriginal peoples “were to be protected
in their original right of ﬁshing on the coast and in the bays of the
Colony.”56 In describing the ﬁshing right as “original,” Douglas meant
that it preceded the British assertion of sovereignty and therefore derived
from sources other than the British Crown, not that it was limited to a
food ﬁshery. In fact, the category of “Indian food ﬁshing” was not yet a
way of thinking about Aboriginal ﬁshing in British Columbia. Established in Canadian ﬁsheries regulations in the late nineteenth century, it
would become an important part of ﬁsheries management and an effective way of diminishing Aboriginal peoples access to the ﬁsh, but it was
not part of the framework in which the treaties were negotiated.57
Rather, the treaties emerged in the context of a long-established commercial relationship. The parties would have understood that the right
to “ﬁsheries as formerly” included a continuing commercial ﬁshery.
How expansive, then, was the understanding of the commercial aspect
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of the treaty right to ﬁsh? At one end of a spectrum of possible meanings, the treaty right might have been intended to protect only commerce
between Aboriginal peoples. This is not likely. In fact, given the context
and the wording of the written text it is highly implausible that the Aboriginal peoples who participated in the negotiations understood they had
conceded anything in respect of their ﬁsheries. Instead, the text suggests
that the Aboriginal signatories could continue their ﬁsheries without any
non-Aboriginal restriction — that is, “as formerly.” At the other end of
the spectrum, therefore, the right could be interpreted literally as securing the ﬁsheries exclusively to Aboriginal peoples. When the treaties were
concluded, Aboriginal peoples worked and managed the ﬁsheries exclusively. Moreover, the laws of many First Nations established certain ﬁsheries as the exclusive property of one family or house-group.
However, Douglas certainly did not intend to preclude non-Aboriginal
ﬁshing. He believed that the long-term prosperity of the colony depended
on attracting immigrants and that the ﬁsheries would be one of its principal draws. The HBC had sought control of the ﬁsheries as part of the
Crown grant of Vancouver Island, but the Crown appears to have withdrawn this provision, which was in an early draft, in the midst of widespread public disapproval of the HBC in London.58 As a result, the HBC
prospectus for the colonization of Vancouver Island informed prospective settlers that “every freeholder shall enjoy the right of ﬁshing all sorts
of ﬁsh in the seas, bays, and inlets of, or surrounding, the said Island.”59
With respect to tidal waters, then, the prospectus asserted the right of the
landowning public to ﬁsh as indeed the common law doctrine of the public right to ﬁsh established it for the public at large.
Is it possible to reconcile previously exclusive Aboriginal ﬁsheries with
the colonial public’s right to ﬁsh? In English law the Crown could not
limit the public right to ﬁsh in tidal waters (except with the sanction of
Parliament), but the common law doctrine did not affect exclusive ﬁsheries that preexisted the British assertion of sovereignty and thus preexisted the common law in British Columbia.60 Such preexisting ﬁsheries
would include exclusive Aboriginal ﬁsheries. Under Aboriginal law some
ﬁsheries were understood as exclusive property, but others were public,
at least in the sense that allies and trading partners were welcome to participate.61 As a result, where Aboriginal peoples held what they understood to be exclusive ﬁshing rights, the Douglas treaties did not interfere
with those rights. In fact, the text conﬁrms that existing ﬁsheries were to
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be protected “as formerly.” Where they did not have exclusive ﬁsheries
— areas that were understood as public ﬁsheries — the treaties provided
the basis for non-Aboriginal participation.
Just as some areas of land under the treaties were to remain for the
exclusive use of Aboriginal peoples (village sites and ﬁelds), so some
Aboriginal ﬁsheries in tidal and nontidal waters were also to remain
exclusively for Aboriginal peoples. But whereas most of the land was to
be opened for non-Aboriginal settlement and the reserved parcels were
small, the opposite was true in the ﬁsheries. The treaties provided expansive protection for the Aboriginal ﬁsheries, with the prospect that nonAboriginal ﬁshers could participate where they could do so without
interfering with these ﬁsheries. Similarly, just as Aboriginal peoples had
the right to continue hunting in a manner that did not interfere with nonAboriginal occupation of lands (the right “to hunt over the unoccupied
lands”), so non-Aboriginal ﬁshers had a right to ﬁsh so long as they did
not hinder the existing Aboriginal ﬁsheries.62 In sum, the right to “ﬁsheries as formerly” is best understood as protecting the Aboriginal ﬁsheries, including the rights to catch ﬁsh and manage the ﬁsheries in the
places where they conducted their ﬁshing and the right to dispose of ﬁsh
for whatever purpose, but also as securing for the Crown the right to
grant settler access to ﬁsheries that were not exclusive before the treaties.
This was a satisfactory resolution in the 1850s, when abundance was
assumed and there was little prospect that non-Aboriginal ﬁshing would
interfere with the Aboriginal ﬁsheries. However, beginning in the 1870s,
many Aboriginal ﬁsheries would come under great strain when, with the
introduction of an industrial ﬁshery, cannery boats worked by Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal ﬁshers occupied owned ﬁshing grounds, and
cannery ﬂeets radically diminished the upriver ﬁsheries on which many
Aboriginal peoples relied. At that point the federal Department of
Marine and Fisheries largely ignored the existing treaties and the
province, with federal acquiescence, refused to negotiate others. Indian
Reserve Commissioner Gilbert Malcolm Sproat, while working to allot
Indian reserves along the Fraser River as part of an Indian land policy in
the absence of treaties, wrote that “if the Crown had ever met the Indians of this Province in council with a view to obtain the surrender of
their lands for purposes of settlement, the Indians would in the ﬁrst place
have made stipulations about their rights to get salmon to supply their
particular requirements.”63
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Instead of negotiating treaties, the two levels of government imposed
an Indian land policy that was premised on continuing Indian access to
their ﬁsheries. The small and scattered Indian reserves allotted under
treaty or by the reserve commissions were intended primarily to provide
points of access to the ﬁsheries that would support viable local economies. Without the ﬁsheries the Indian reserve geography in British
Columbia provided little prospect for other commercial activity and
made little sense except as a means of clearing Aboriginal peoples from
the land.64 In this context the Aboriginal ﬁsheries ought to have been,
in the words of James Douglas, “fully secured to them by law.” Those
who were parties to the Douglas treaties reasonably believed that they
had been.

judicial interpretation of “fisheries
as formerly”
As of 2007, Canada’s courts had yet to provide a deﬁnitive judicial interpretation of the right to “ﬁsheries as formerly” in the Douglas treaties.
The British Columbia Court of Appeal’s 1989 decision in Saanichton
Marina Ltd. v. Tsawout Indian Band remained the principal judicial
statement of the treaty right to ﬁsh.65 In that case the Tsawout presented
evidence that Saanichton Bay, where they and their ancestors lived, “provided a wide variety of ﬁsh, shellﬁsh, sea mammals and waterfowl
important in the economy and diet of the Saanich people.”66 They
claimed a continuing treaty right to ﬁsh and argued that a proposed
marina development in the bay infringed this right. The court agreed,
concluding that “the effect of the treaty is to afford to the Indians an
independent source of protection of their right to carry on their ﬁsheries
as formerly,”67 and that in this case the “construction of the marina will
derogate from the right of the Indians to carry on their ﬁsheries as formerly in the area of Saanichton Bay which is protected by the treaty.”68
Although the court was not explicit, the decision seemed to imply a right
to participate in determining what activities might coexist with their ﬁsheries. In other words the treaty recognized the Tsawout right to access
and manage their ﬁsheries.
After that decision the courts struggled to deﬁne the treaty right to
ﬁsh more precisely. It seemed clear that the treaties protect and give priority to a food ﬁshery, a category that was ﬁrmly entrenched in Cana144 douglas c. harris

dian law by then. In Regina v. Ellsworth, a case involving charges against
a member of the Tsartlip First Nation who was ﬁshing coho and chinook salmon in the Goldstream River for food purposes, Justice Murphy
of the British Columbia Supreme Court deﬁned the right broadly to
include “ﬁshing, conservation and the use of ﬁsh by the Indian people for
whatever purpose the ﬁsh were used by the signatories to the treaty. One
of these purposes was for food obviously.”69 In this view the treaty recognized the priority of the Native ﬁshery, at least but not limited to a
food ﬁshery, as well as a right to participate in the conservation or management of the ﬁsh stocks.
Justice Harvey Groberman, also of the British Columbia Supreme
Court, described a similar set of treaty rights, including priority to the
ﬁshery and management rights, in Snuueymuxw First Nation v. British
Columbia. In that case the Snuueymuxw (Nanaimo) First Nation sought
an interlocutory injunction to remove log booms from the Nanaimo
River estuary on the basis that they damaged ﬁsh habitat and infringed
the treaty right to ﬁsh. Justice Groberman held: “The contours of the
right to ‘carry on ﬁsheries as formerly’ have not been fully articulated by
the courts. The treaty would seem, at the very least, to entitle the First
Nation to priority over the ﬁsh stocks that exist. It also places responsibilities on the Crown and vests the First Nation with powers to manage
the ﬁshery in such a manner as not to jeopardize the constitutionally
protected rights of the Douglas Treaty First Nations.”70 The nature of
the priority, including the question of whether priority extends to a commercial ﬁshery, remained undeveloped. In Regina v. Hunt, Justice Brian
Saunderson of the British Columbia Provincial Court held that the treaty
right does not include either a commercial ﬁshery or a deep-water ﬁshery because the Kwakiutl had not established, to his satisfaction, that
either activity was integral to the distinctive culture of the Kwakiutl.71
The Kwakiutl did not appeal Justice Saunderson’s decision, but they
subsequently brought a treaty ﬁshing rights case on their terms. In Hunt
v. Canada they sued Canada and the province for a declaration that their
treaty right to ﬁsh in their territory includes “a priority right to harvest
the aquatic resources . . . and to the commercial sale of a reasonable
quantity of ﬁsh to meet their livelihood needs” and “a right to manage
and conserve the aquatic resources . . . exercisable together with Canada’s power to manage the ﬁshery.”72 These pleadings, which frame the
right to a ﬁshery in terms of “livelihood needs,” reveal how central that
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approach has become to the interpretation of treaty ﬁshing rights. The
Kwakiutl did not append “moderate” to their claim, but the term “livelihood needs” suggests that they recognize some limit on their treaty right
beyond conservation. And rather than claiming jurisdiction over the ﬁsheries, the Kwakiutl sought a declaration of joint management. The pleadings are an indication of what some First Nations believe to be possible
within the parameters of Canadian law.
Although the ﬁsheries certainly supported Aboriginal peoples’ livelihoods, there is no evidence that the Douglas treaty right was limited to
ﬁsheries that supported “moderate” livelihoods. Where this limitation
has been imposed, as in Passenger Fishing Vessel and Marshall, it is a
later construct designed to establish some grounds for those without
treaty rights to participate in the ﬁshery. Although the aim is legitimate,
the “moderate livelihood” standard is ﬂawed. Beyond the fact that there
may be no historical evidence for such a standard, it is inherently vague
and changeable, and not something that courts are equipped to determine. Moreover, the building of a moderate livelihood, if its meaning
can be determined, depends on so much more than access to a resource
that it seems peculiar to establish the level of access on the basis of that
standard. A clear division of the ﬁsheries along the lines of the Boldt
decision, which provides certainty and is broadly if not unanimously perceived as a fair interpretation of the treaty, is eminently preferable to all
those working in the ﬁsheries, and to the sustainability of the ﬁsheries
themselves.

conclusion
In attempting to account for the Boldt decision, legal scholar Fay Cohen
has suggested that by the early 1970s the state of the law on Indian treaty
rights to ﬁsh was such that “a deﬁnitive ruling could hardly have been
avoided.”73 Perhaps so. Perhaps thirty years later Aboriginal and treaty
rights to ﬁsh in British Columbia are at a similar point, and perhaps a
case such as Hunt v. Canada will provide a deﬁnitive ruling. However,
unlike Washington State, where most of the tribes hold rights to ﬁsh
under treaties with virtually identical ﬁsheries provisions, in British
Columbia in 2007 there is a patchwork of arrangements that include
historical treaties, one modern treaty, two ﬁnal agreements in the process
of ratiﬁcation, and several agreements-in-principle, all with different ﬁsh146 douglas c. harris

eries provisions. For most of the province there are no treaty rights but,
instead, ill-deﬁned Aboriginal rights to ﬁsh or rights to ﬁsheries as an
incidence of claimed but not-yet-recognized Aboriginal title. In this context a single deﬁnitive ruling seems unlikely. A clear ruling from the
courts on the meaning of the ﬁsheries provision in the Douglas treaties
will not resolve the continuing conﬂict over ﬁsh, but it might hasten a
resolution.
The recognition of Aboriginal and treaty rights to ﬁsh in Canada has
been building slowly since they were entrenched in the Canadian constitution. Steps to enhance Aboriginal peoples’ access to the ﬁsheries,
following decisions such as Sparrow and Marshall, have produced determined opposition from many in the commercial ﬂeet, including court
cases based on the proposition that privileging Aboriginal ﬁshers violates the equality guarantee in the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.74 In this there are important similarities to the reaction against the
Boldt decision in Washington. However, judicial recognition of substantial treaty rights to ﬁsh in British Columbia, should it occur, could
hardly shock the ﬁshers and ﬁsheries managers in the province to the
same degree that it did those in Washington.
Although a small number of Aboriginal peoples are parties to the
Douglas treaties, a fuller judicial interpretation of the right to “ﬁsheries
as formerly” will be important across the province. It will establish the
extent to which the tribes reserved their ﬁsheries to themselves when
they granted to the Hudson’s Bay Company the right to occupy certain
areas of their traditional territories. Understood as reserved rights instead
of granted rights (rights that the treaty tribes reserved to themselves
rather than received from the Crown), the treaty rights would represent,
at a minimum, the ﬁshing rights that nontreaty nations still retain. As a
result, the impact of a judicial interpretation of the ﬁsheries clause in the
Douglas treaties has the potential to extend across most of the province,
building on the basic platform of ﬁshing rights that the Supreme Court
of Canada established in the Sparrow decision.
Given the continuing conﬂict over the ﬁsheries in British Columbia
and the great difﬁculty in reaching negotiated settlements, a courtdirected interpretation of the ﬁsheries provision in the Douglas treaties
seems inevitable. That interpretation, when it occurs, will be based on
the text of the treaty and the surrounding circumstances at the time each
treaty was negotiated. It is hard to imagine that the interpretation of the
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Stevens treaties in Washington State will not also have some impact on
the outcome. In a dissenting opinion in the British Columbia Court of
Appeal on a commercial ﬁshing rights case, Justice Lambert suggested
that the interpretations of the Stevens treaties certainly ought to be considered. He thought it “of great importance to try to achieve harmony
between the recognition of aboriginal rights in British Columbia and the
recognition of aboriginal rights in Washington State, where the Indians
are closely related to the Indians of British Columbia and where they
share many of the same customs, traditions, and practices.”75
The holding in the Boldt decision that access to the commercial ﬁshery should be divided evenly between Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal
ﬁshers may not be reproduced. That conclusion is perhaps too closely a
product of the particular language in the Stevens treaties. However, the
general conclusions that the treaties include rights to a substantial commercial ﬁshery and to manage that ﬁshery seem applicable and appropriate to the interpretation of the Douglas treaties. If a ruling fails to
recognize that the treaties protected signiﬁcant Aboriginal control of the
ﬁsheries, it will appear manifestly unjust.
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